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SMU LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
T first blush the relationship between the antitrust laws and the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
("DTPA") 1 might not be apparent. The antitrust laws are gener-
ally thought to be concerned with protecting competition. 2 In contrast,
the stated purpose of the DTPA is "to protect consumers against false,
misleading and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and
breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical procedures
to secure such protection. ' '3
The shared denominator is the concern of both antitrust law and the
DTPA for the consumer. The United States Supreme Court has de-
scribed the antitrust laws, collectively, as a "'consumer welfare prescrip-
tion,'"4 and the lower courts have echoed this principle, recognizing that
"[u]ltimately, the consumer is the beneficiary."'5
An additional connection is found in the origins of the DTPA itself.
The statute is modeled after the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC");
indeed, the DTPA provides:
It is the intent of the legislature that in construing Subsection (a) of
this section. . .the courts to the extent possible will be guided
by.. .the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and
federal courts to Section 5(a)( 1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.6
The relationship between the antitrust laws and the DTPA should not,
however, be pressed too far. Although both are ultimately concerned
with consumer welfare, antitrust and the DTPA focus on different aspects
of the competitive process. While antitrust is primarily concerned with
the misuse of market power to harm consumers, the DTPA primarily fo-
cuses on consumer harm brought about through deception. Further, al-
though consumer protection statutes like the DTPA are frequently
referred to as the "little FTC Acts," 7 in enacting the DTPA the legislature
did not include the "unfair methods of competition" prong of section 5 of
the FTC Act but rather adopted only the "deceptive acts or practices"
prong of section 5.8 Further, it should be noted that the concept of "con-
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 et seq. (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006) [here-
inafter "DTPA"].
2. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 251
(1993).
3. DTPA § 17.44(a).
4. Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting ROBERT BORK, THE ANTI-
TRUST PARADOX 66 (Free Press 1978)).
5. Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir. 1994).
6. DTPA § 17.46(c)( 1).
7. Marla Pleyte, Online Undercover Marketing: A Reminder of the FTC's Unique Po-
sition to Combat Deceptive Practices, 6 U.C. DAvis Bus. L.J. 14 (2006) ("Many states have
enacted consumer protection laws known as Little FTC Acts. ").
8. DTPA § 17.46(a).
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sumer welfare" itself is not all of a piece, as illustrated by one of the court
decisions discussed in this year's Survey.
This Survey covers significant developments under the federal and
Texas antitrust laws and the Texas DTPA from November 1, 2005,
through October 31, 2006.
II. ANTITRUST STATUTES
"The Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, enacted in 1890, the Clayton Act, 38
Stat. 730, enacted in 1914, and the Robinson-Patman Act, which
amended the Clayton Act in 1936, all serve the purpose of protecting
competition."9 Likewise, the purpose of the Texas Free Enterprise and
Antitrust Act ("TFEAA") 10 "is to maintain and promote economic com-
petition in trade and commerce occurring wholly or partly within the
State of Texas and to provide the benefits of that competition to consum-
ers in the state."11 Noteworthy antitrust decisions rendered during the
Survey period address market power, joint ventures, and the TFEAA's
extraterritorial reach.
A. THE SHERMAN Act
The principal federal antitrust statutes are sections I and 2 of the Sher-
man Act.12 Section 1 condemns contracts, combinations, and conspira-
cies in unreasonable restraint of trade, 13 whereas section 2 condemns
monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize
a relevant economic market.1 4 Although certain offenses like price-fixing
among competitors are deemed illegal per se, meaning that no proof of
actual market impact is required, most antitrust claims require proof of
an actual or threatened injury to competition, which in turn usually re-
quires proof that the defendant possesses market power in a relevant eco-
nomic market.1 5
In Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,16 the United States
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a patented product nec-
essarily confers market power on the patent holder. The defendants were
manufacturers of patented printheads and ink containers and unpatented
ink who marketed the products together to original equipment manufac-
9. Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 251.
10. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.26 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006).
11. Id. § 15.04.
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000). The parallel provisions under Texas law are TFEAA sec-
tions 15.05(a) and (b). TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 15.05 (a)-( b) (Vernon 2002 &
Supp. 2006).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Notwithstanding the literal language of the statute, the Su-
preme Court recognized as early as 1911 that section 1 only condemns unreasonable re-
straints. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106, 175-84 (1911). See also Bus.
Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988); Northwest Wholesale Station-
ers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 569 (1966).
15. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
16. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
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turers ("OEMs"), who in turn agreed to purchase ink exclusively from
the manufacturers. The OEMs also agreed that neither they nor their
customers would refill the containers. The plaintiff was a competing
manufacturer who alleged that this marketing scheme constituted illegal
"tying" of ink to the patented printhead system 17 and monopolization.
The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment based on the
absence of evidence defining the relevant market or establishing the de-
fendants' power within the relevant market.1"
The Federal Circuit reversed. The court believed that it was bound by
Supreme Court precedent recognizing an inference of market power aris-
ing from a patented product. 19 The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to
undertake a fresh examination of the history of both the judicial and leg-
islative appraisals of tying arrangements. '20 Based upon an extensive his-
torical analysis of the original purpose of the market power inference and
how patent law and antitrust law jurisprudence have changed since that
time, the Court concluded that tying arrangements involving patented
products are unlawful only when supported by proof, not a presumption,
of market power in the relevant market.21
In Texaco Inc. v. Dagher,22 the Supreme Court encountered allegations
of price setting by a joint venture. Defendants Texaco, Inc. and Shell Oil
had teamed up in a joint venture called Equilon Enterprises in order to
refine and sell gasoline in the Western United States under the Texaco
and Shell brand names. Equilon set a single price for both Texaco and
Shell brand gasoline. Service station owners sued, alleging that, by unify-
ing gas prices under the two brands, the defendants had engaged in un-
lawful price-fixing that was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. The plaintiffs did not argue that the defendants' actions were illegal
under the rule of reason.23
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ants, holding that the per se rule did not apply and that the plaintiffs'
decision not to seek recovery under the rule of reason doomed their
claim. 24 The Ninth Circuit reversed, characterizing the defendants' argu-
ment as requesting an exception to the per se rule against price-fixing,
and then rejecting that request. 25
A unanimous Supreme Court (less Justice Alito, who took no part in
17. A tying arrangement "is an agreement by a party to sell one product [the tying
product] but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) prod-
uct, or at least agrees that he will not purchase the product from any other supplier."
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) (footnote omitted).
18. 126 S. Ct. at 1284-85.
19. Id. at 1285.
20. Id. at 1285.
21. Id. at 1285-93.
22. 126 S. Ct. 1276 (2006).
23. Id. at 1278-79.
24. Id. at 1279.
25. Id.
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the consideration of the case) reversed. 26 The Court acknowledged that
horizontal price-fixing agreements are per se unlawful. 27 The Court held,
however, that Texaco's and Shell's price-setting actions were not that of
competitors, but of participants in the Equilon joint venture. The Court
held that "[w]hen 'persons who would otherwise be competitors pool
their capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for
profit . . .such joint ventures [are] regarded as a single firm competing
with other sellers in the market." 28 As such, the price-setting before the
Court was actually done by a single entity and was "not price-fixing in the
antitrust sense." 29
The Court held that Equilon's decision to sell gas under two brand
names did not affect the analysis because a joint venture has the discre-
tion to determine both the prices at which it sells its products and the
brand names under which they are sold.30 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court assumed that Equilon was a lawful joint venture because its forma-
tion had been approved by federal and state regulators and there was no
contention that it was a sham.31 The Court noted that had the plaintiffs
challenged Equilon itself, they would have had to show that its creation
was anticompetitive under the rule of reason. 32
B. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The federal Robinson-Patman Act prohibits certain forms of discrimi-
nation by sellers in the prices and other terms of sale extended to their
customers. 33 There is no parallel provision in the TFEAA.
In Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC,3 4 a dealer
of specially-ordered, heavy-duty trucks sued Volvo, alleging that Volvo
discriminated between dealers in its pricing. Volvo manufactures heavy-
duty trucks that are sold by distributors to customers through a competi-
tive bidding process. Under that process, the retail customer describes its
specific product requirements and invites bids from dealers. When a
dealer receives the customer's specifications, it contacts Volvo and re-
quests a discount off the wholesale price. Volvo decides on a case-by-case
basis whether to offer a discount and, if so, what the discount will be. The
dealer then uses the Volvo discount in preparing its bid, and trucks are
purchased from Volvo only if the retail customer accepts the bid. Volvo's
dealers are assigned to nonexclusive geographic territories. In the event
that multiple dealers compete for a single customer, Volvo's policy is to
26. Id. at 1278.
27. Id.






33. See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOP-
MENTS Ch. V (5th ed. 2002).
34. 126 S. Ct. 860 (2006).
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provide the dealers the same discount. 35
Reeder was an authorized Volvo dealer that participated in the com-
petitive-bidding process. Volvo announced its intention to enlarge its
dealers' territories, thereby reducing the number of dealers. Around the
same time, Reeder learned that Volvo had given another dealer a dis-
count greater than the discounts Reeder typically received. This led
Reeder to suspect that it was one of the dealers destined for elimination.
Reeder sued Volvo, alleging violations of the Robinson-Patman Act and
the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act. 36
At trial, Reeder relied primarily on comparisons between discounts
Volvo offered Reeder when it was bidding against non-Volvo dealers and
larger discounts Volvo offered to other dealers bidding against non-Volvo
dealers for bidding processes in which Reeder did not participate. In four
of the examples presented, Reeder was the successful bidder and pur-
chased Volvo trucks. Reeder did not search for or present any evidence
of instances in which it received larger discounts than did other Volvo
dealers in different bidding processes. Nor did Reeder conduct any sta-
tistical analysis as to whether it was disfavored on average compared to
any other dealer or set of dealers. 37
Reeder did present evidence of two instances where Reeder bid against
another Volvo dealer for a single customer. In one instance, Reeder ini-
tially was offered a smaller discount than its competitor. Volvo then in-
creased the discount until both dealers had the same discount. Neither
dealer won the bid. In the other instance, Volvo offered both dealers the
same discount. After the customer selected the other dealer, the cus-
tomer demanded a further price concession, to which Volvo agreed. 38
The jury found in favor of Reeder and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 39
Reversing, the Supreme Court recalled prior holdings that the Robinson-
Patman Act proscribes price discrimination only when it threatens to in-
jure competition, not simply whenever different prices are charged to dif-
ferent customers. 40 Competitive injury may be found in diversion of sales
or profits from a disfavored purchaser to a favored purchaser. 41 A per-
missible inference of such injury may arise from evidence that a favored
competitor received a significant price reduction over a substantial period
of time.42
The Court found Reeder's evidence insufficient to establish competi-
tive injury.43 Evidence of a difference between the price offered to
Reeder for bidding to one customer and the price offered to another
35. Id. at 866-67.
36. Id. at 867.
37. Id. at 867-68.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 868.
40. Id. at 870.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 871.
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Volvo dealer for bidding to a different customer fell short because it did
not show discrimination for the same customer. 44 The incidents also were
separated in time by as much as seven months and were not the subject of
a systematic study.45 The Court concluded that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support even an inference of a favored dealer or set of dealers
because it did not preclude the possibility that Reeder might have re-
ceived a better price than one or more of the dealers in its comparisons. 46
The evidence of head-to-head bidding likewise failed to establish com-
petitive injury because it did not show that Reeder was disfavored or that
the discrimination was substantial.47 Acknowledging that Reeder may
have competed with other Volvo dealers for the opportunity to bid on a
potential sale, the Court noted that competition for the opportunity to
bid was based on factors other than price.48 Indeed, a dealer approaches
Volvo for a price only after it has been invited to submit a bid.49
The Fifth Circuit considered the "meeting competition" defense to the
Robinson-Patman Act ("Act") in Water Craft Management LLC v. Mer-
cury Marine.50 In that case, distributors of marine products sued a manu-
facturer of such products for price discrimination under the Act. Water
Craft sold marine products, including outboard motors purchased from
Mercury Marine. Water Craft's largest competitor was Travis Boating
Center. For several years, Travis had a sales agreement with outboard
motor manufacturer Outboard Marine Corporation ("OMC") but not
with Mercury Marine. Travis was expanding rapidly-in some instances
buying Mercury Marine dealerships and converting them to Travis retail
stores that did not carry Mercury Marine motors. As a result, Mercury
Marine was losing market share to OMC.51
Seeking to stem this loss of market share, Mercury Marine attempted
to enlist Travis as a distributor. Travis refused on the ground that Mer-
cury's prices were not competitive with OMC's process. Mercury Marine
eventually offered Travis product discounts. Water Craft then sued,
claiming that the discounts extended to Travis were greater than those
available to Water Craft or other distributors in the area.52
Mercury Marine defended on the ground that the discounts it offered
Travis were in response to OMC's low prices and therefore fell within the
"meeting competition" defense. This defense is available when the lower
price to the favored dealer is made in good faith for the purpose of meet-
ing a competitor's price. Mercury Marine presented evidence that it had
relied on several sources for its estimation of OMC's prices and at-
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 870-72.
47. Id. at 872.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 457 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2006).




tempted to corroborate that information by studying boat pricing in the
market and monitoring industry gossip. 53
The district court found that Mercury Marine was entitled to the meet-
ing competition defense. On appeal, Water Craft challenged the district
court's factual finding that Mercury Marine had acted in good faith.54
Rejecting this challenge, the Fifth Circuit first analyzed case law, recog-
nizing that analysis of the meeting competition defense is fact specific,
that good faith does not require absolute certainty that a price concession
is necessary to meet an equally low price offered by a competitor, and
that the concept of good faith is "'flexible and pragmatic, not technical or
doctrinaire."' 55 The court also recited several recognized indicia of good
faith, such as (1) whether the seller had received reports of similar dis-
counts from several customers; (2) whether the seller was threatened with
termination if it failed to meet a discount; (3) whether the seller made
efforts to corroborate the reported discount; and (4) whether the seller
had prior experience with the favored dealer.56
Applying these indicia to the evidence, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the record supported the district court's finding that Mercury Marine ac-
ted in good faith.57 The Fifth Circuit noted that, had Mercury Marine
investigated its competitor's pricing further, it might have exposed itself
to risk of liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act.58 Further, the act
of meeting a competitor's price in order to win a new customer, when
that customer had previously refused to do business, matched the Su-
preme Court's recognition that the indicia of good faith include a buyer's
price-related threats of termination.59 Under either mode of analysis, the
final, lower price appears necessary to compete, rather than an attempt to
undermine competition. 60
The Fifth Circuit also rejected Water Craft's argument, first advanced
at oral argument, that Mercury Marine did not meet the competition be-
cause its prices to Travis remained above OMC's prices. 61 The key factor
of the meeting competition defense is the seller's intent to meet a compet-
itor's price, not the actual relationship between the two prices. 62 Grant-
ing the defense only to defendants who actually meet a competitor's
price, and not also to those who attempt to compete by offering discounts
short of the competitor's price, would have the perverse effect of limiting
the defense to those who discriminate more.63 Accordingly, the Fifth Cir-
53. Id. at 487-88, 490.
54. Id. at 488.
55. Id. at 489 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 454
(1978)).
56. Id. at 488-89.
57. Id. at 490.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 490-91.
60. Id. at 491.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 492.
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cuit held that the meeting competition defense is available if the defen-
dant offers a discriminatory price in response to the competition even if
the defendant knows that its discriminatory price is not as low as its com-
petitor's price. 64
C. CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY AND SENTENCING
In United States v. Rose,65 the Fifth Circuit considered the appropriate
sentence for a corporate president's conviction for conspiracy to "sup-
press and eliminate competition by fixing the price, rigging bids, and allo-
cating customers for choline chloride," a B complex vitamin.66 In 1997,
Defendant Rose became the president of a choline chloride manufacturer
DuCoa, L.P. At that time, DuCoa, Bioproducts, Inc., and Chinook
Group Limited accounted for ninety percent of the United States choline
chloride market. After the United States Department of Justice began a
grand jury investigation into price-fixing of bulk vitamins, Bioproducts
approached the Justice Department and exposed a price-fixing conspiracy
involving choline chloride. The ensuing investigation and indictments led
to guilty pleas from five current and former officers of both DuCoa and
Chinook as well as DuCoa's guilty plea.67
Rose was indicted for conspiracy to violate section 1 of the Sherman
Act, found guilty, and sentenced to thirty months imprisonment. The
sentence included an enhancement for bid-rigging, an enhancement for
affecting in excess of $15 million in commerce, and an enhancement for
Rose's role in the conspiracy as a manager or supervisor. On appeal,
Rose challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction,
the district court's finding that he was a manager or supervisor, and the
time period used to calculate the volume of commerce affected by the
conspiracy.68
Affirming the conviction, the Fifth Circuit relied upon evidence show-
ing that the three companies entered into an agreement to maintain their
respective shares of the U.S. choline chloride market.69 In furtherance of
the agreement, the companies fixed prices for choline chloride disclosed
in trade journals and used those prices as a reference point in determin-
ing the price for various customers. They also decided which company
would offer the lowest price for choline chloride at particular competi-
tive-bidding opportunities. 70
Rose argued that the conspiracy no longer existed when he became
president of DuCoa.71 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit found that the companies
did occasionally engage in competitive activity in disregard of their agree-
64. Id. at 491-92.
65. 449 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. 2006).




70. Id. at 630.
71. Id. at 632.
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ment and that, at the time Rose assumed office, there had been increased
disregard of the agreement and decreased communication between the
competitors. 72 Nevertheless, there was evidence that the outgoing presi-
dent believed the conspiracy was continuing, met with Rose to learn
about the business, and believed that he openly discussed the conspiracy
with Rose.73
Rose's immediate subordinate similarly believed that the conspiracy
was ongoing when Rose became president.7 4 That employee testified
that he discussed the conspiracy with Rose and that he and Rose were
both present at meetings of the conspirators at which market allocation
and pricing was discussed.75 The Fifth Circuit concluded that this evi-
dence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.7 6
Turning to Rose's sentence,, the Fifth Circuit held that the district
court's factual finding regarding Rose's role in the offense was appropri-
ate. 77 Once Rose knew of the conspiracy, he determined whether DuCoa
would continue to participate, had the authority to decide which bids
would be submitted to customers, spoke for DuCoa at the meetings with
the competition, and made decisions for DuCoa.78
The Fifth Circuit agreed, however, with Rose's challenge to the amount
of commerce allegedly affected by the conspiracy. 79 Rose claimed that
his involvement, if any, in the conspiracy did not begin until he attended
his first meeting of the competitors.8 0 Although there was evidence that
Rose was aware of the conspiracy when he became DuCoa's president,
there was neither evidence that he had knowingly joined or participated
in the conspiracy at that time 81 nor any evidence that Rose failed to stop
a subordinate that he knew was participating.8 2 The earliest either situa-
tion could have occurred was when Rose began discussing the conspiracy
with his subordinate. 83 Because the Fifth Circuit was unable to say
whether the resulting error in calculating the amount of commerce af-
fected was harmless, the court vacated Rose's sentence and remanded for
resentencing.8 4
D. TEXAS FREE ENTERPRISE AND ANTITRUST ACT
The plaintiffs in Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co.8 5 were Royal
72. Id. at 630.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 631.
75. Id. at 631-32.
76. Id. at 633.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 633-34.





84. Id. at 635.
85. 218 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2006).
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Crown Cola distributors in a four-state region covering portions of Texas,
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma (the "Ark-La-Tex" region). The
plaintiffs sued Coca-Cola and its distributors, alleging that certain mar-
keting agreements between Coke and its distributors unreasonably re-
strained trade and that Coke was liable for monopolization and
conspiracy and attempt to monopolize in violation of the TFEAA and the
antitrust laws of the other states in the region.
Sodas are distributed to retail locations by bottlers. In the Ark-La-Tex
region, the Coca-Cola bottler and its affiliates held seventy-five to eighty
percent of the market for national brands of soda. The Pepsi-Cola bottler
held thirteen to fifteen percent of the market, and Royal Crown Cola
bottlers held the remainder. 86
Soda manufacturers and bottlers use promotional agreements with re-
tailers known as calendar-marketing agreements ("CMAs"). CMAs typ-
ically provide that in exchange for payments and price discounts, the
retailer will promote the distributor's product over competing brands for
a specified period of time. For example, a CMA might provide for partic-
ular advertising or preferential product placement within the store, that
the retailer must price the distributor's products below those of compet-
ing brands, or even that the retailer is prohibited from promoting com-
peting brands.8 7
Coca-Cola used CMAs with most retailers in the Ark-La-Tex region,
including every major retailer other than Wal-Mart. Coke's CMAs in the
region prohibited or limited retailer advertising of competing national
brands. The CMAs generally covered between forty-two and fifty-two
weeks of the year, compared to twenty-six weeks in other regions of the
country. Coke's CMAs sometimes required retailers to price certain
products below competing products even when the competitor's whole-
sale prices were below Coke's, forcing the retailers to raise their prices
for the competing products in order to comply. For some retailers,
Coke's CMAs paid bonuses if the retailer agreed not to carry competitive
flavors of root beer, orange, and grape sodas. Coke also occasionally re-
quired retailers to give more shelf space to Coke's root beer, orange, and
grape products than was justified by the market share of those products.8 8
Acknowledging that CMAs are not inherently anticompetitive, the
plaintiffs complained that Coke used its dominant position in the Ark-La-
Tex region to negotiate CMAs with terms that suppressed competition.8 9
The plaintiffs presented expert testimony that Coke's use of its dominant
market share to force retailers into restrictive CMAs inhibited competi-
tion and negatively impacted the plaintiffs' sales of Royal Crown prod-
ucts. 90 Among other things, the plaintiffs alleged that they were unable
86. Id. at 675.
87. Id. at 676.
88. Id. at 676-77.
89. Id. at 676.
90. Id. at 677.
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to introduce two products into the market without diverting shelf space
from other Royal Crown products.91 In contrast, at Wal-Mart, where
there were no Coke CMAs, competing bottlers had no difficulty getting
shelf space, and Coke products often sold at prices higher than those for
competing sodas.92 The plaintiffs' expert also testified that Coke was
monopolizing or attempting to monopolize the soda markets served by
the parties and was likely to succeed if not stopped. 93 However, the ex-
pert neither opined on how Coke's CMAs affected marketwide prices or
output, nor attempted to precisely quantify the amount of competition
foreclosed by the CMAs. 94
The jury found for the plaintiffs and assessed actual damages in excess
of $5 million. 95 Coke appealed, and the Texarkana Court of Appeals af-
firmed. 96 In a 5-4 decision, the Texas Supreme Court reversed.97 Writing
for the majority, Justice Hecht first held that as a matter of statutory con-
struction, the Texas Legislature did not intend for the TFEAA to remedy
injury occurring in other states. 98 Invoking the principle that a statute
will be given extraterritorial effect only when such intent is clear, the ma-
jority held that no provision of the TFEAA evinced a purpose of promot-
ing competition outside Texas or redressing extraterritorial injury.99 The
supreme court also rejected the arguments that the TFEAA applied be-
cause Coke engaged in the same conduct both within and without Texas
and because Coke made decisions in Texas regarding CMAs used in other
states.100
Turning to the claims under the other states' antitrust laws, the major-
ity held that comity requires Texas courts to defer to the courts of other
states to enforce those states' antitrust laws.101 Even in the absence of
any contention that the statutes differed, the supreme court would not
presume them to be the same because application of antitrust laws re-
quires analysis of economic theory and social needs and values.102 The
majority reasoned that abstention is required when a court must deter-
mine another state's policies in order to adjudicate rights claimed under
that state's statutes. 103 The majority thus concluded that the trial court
should not have entertained the plaintiffs' claims under the antitrust laws
of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma.10 4





95. Id. at 678.
96. Id. at 679.
97. Id. at 675.
98. Id. at 682.
99. Id. at 682-83.
100. Id. at 683.
101. Id. at 684-85.
102. Id. at 686-87.
103. Id. at 685.
104. Id. at 688.
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Texas. 10 5 Coke conceded that it held a seventy-five and eighty percent
share of the Ark-La-Tex market, and the record was "replete with evi-
dence that Coke used its dominant market position to extract from retail-
ers agreements with terms it might not otherwise have been able to
obtain to promote its products with more favorable advertising and store
displays and lower prices."10 6 Coke nonetheless argued that there was no
evidence of a substantial foreclosure of competition or a sufficient ad-
verse impact on price, output, or choice.1 0 7 The majority agreed, con-
cluding that the evidence established "only that Coke's CMAs could have
had"'1 8 anticompetitive and monopolistic effects, which did not entitle
the jury to infer that the CMAs did have such effects. 10 9 In the absence
of evidence quantifying the effect of Coke's CMAs in any relevant mar-
ket, or establishing that the market foreclosure was substantial, the plain-
tiffs' claims could not succeed. 1 10
RTLC AG Products, Inc. v. Treatment Equipment Co.1 " involved the
question of whether a "sole source" agreement was a per se violation of
the TFEAA. The case arose from the City of Dallas' Bachman Water
Treatment Plant Filter Improvements Project. Dallas County had
adopted uniform specifications for water and waste treatment facilities,
including specifications for fabricated steel and stainless steel pipe, filters,
and valves. Plaintiff RTLC supplied the specified steel and stainless steel
pipe. In the Dallas area, defendant Treatment Equipment was the au-
thorized representative for the specified filters and defendant Municipal
Valve was the representative for the specified valves.' 1 2
When Dallas County sought bids for the Bachman project, Treatment
Equipment, Municipal Valve, and defendant Piping Systems, Inc., which
manufactures the specified pipes, agreed to submit a combined bid that
packaged their respective components to general contractors bidding on
the project. RTLC submitted a bid to the same general contractors for
the pipe alone. The general contractors accepted the packaged bid and
used it in their successful bid to Dallas County. l" 3
RTLC sued Treatment Equipment, Municipal Valve, and Piping Sys-
tems, Inc., among others, alleging an unlawful tying arrangement in viola-
tion of the TFEAA. Treatment Equipment and Municipal Valve filed
successful no-evidence motions for summary judgment and RTLC
appealed.' 1 4
The Dallas Court of Appeals first addressed RTLC's argument that ty-
ing steel pipe to the sole source filters and valves was an arrangement
105. Id.
106. Id. at 689.
107. Id. at 689-90.
108. Id. at 690 (emphasis in original).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 689-90 (emphasis added).
111. 195 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
112. Id. at 827-28.




that, on its face, had an anticompetitive effect and thus should be consid-
ered a per se violation of the TFEAA.115 The court of appeals held that
under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Tool Works,
Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.,116 tying arrangements are not subject to per
se analysis.117 Rather, liability requires proof of sufficient market power
in the tying product market to restrain competition in the tied product
market." 8 The court of appeals thus rejected RTLC's argument."19
The court of appeals then examined the evidence offered by RTLC in
opposition to the summary judgment motions.120 The court of appeals
described the elements of a tying claim under the TFEAA as:
(1) a tying [condition]; (2) actual coercion by the seller that forced
the buyer to accept the tied product; (3) the seller must have suffi-
cient market power in the tying product market to force the buyer to
accept the tied product; (4) there are anticompetitive effects in the
tied market; and (5) the seller's activity in the tied product must in-
volve a substantial amount of interstate commerce. 121
The court of appeals held that RTLC's evidence with respect to only a
single buyer on a single project was insufficient to warrant antitrust con-
cern.' 22 Because RTLC did not meet its burden of producing a scintilla
of evidence on this element of its claim, the court of appeals affirmed the
summary judgment. 23
In Roberts v. Whitfill,a24 the Waco Court of Appeals considered
whether standing under the TFEAA can be challenged for the first time
on appeal. Roberts and Whitfill were former partners in a telecommuni-
cations business who became rivals. Both received services from a third
party, and Whitfill believed that she was paying more than Roberts for
the services. Whitfill sued Roberts and the third party, asserting claims of
preferential pricing and restraint of trade in violation of the TFEAA.
The case was tried to a jury, which found in favor of Whitfill, and the trial
court entered judgment against the defendants jointly and severally for
$758,264.19, representing a trebling of the actual damages, attorneys'
fees, and costs, and against Roberts for $50,000 in exemplary damages.
Roberts appealed, arguing that Whitfill lacked antitrust standing and that
the damages award was legally flawed.' 25
115. Id. at 831-32.
116. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
117. RTLC, 195 S.W.3d at 832.
118. As noted above, the TFEAA is to be construed in harmony with federal interpre-
tation of comparable federal antitrust statutes. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.04
(Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006).





124. 191 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, no pet.).
125. Id. at 351-54.
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The Waco Court of Appeals initially considered whether it could hear
the standing question, which Roberts raised for the first time on ap-
peal. 126 The court of appeals held that while it might be a better practice
to raise antitrust standing in the trial court, there was no reason to differ-
entiate antitrust standing from standing in general, which can be raised
for the first time on appeal.127
The court of appeals then considered whether Whitfill had established
antitrust standing, which requires that the injury to the plaintiff corre-
sponds to an injury of the same type to the relevant market.' 2 8 Whitfill
claimed that Roberts and the third party had secretly agreed that Whitfill
would be charged more than Roberts. She argued that this agreement
restrained trade because it provided preferential pricing to Roberts, sup-
pressed and destroyed competition, and had the effect of increasing
prices.' 29 Whitfill also asserted that the agreement provided an unfair
pricing advantage that prevented her from competing with Roberts and
deprived customers of the benefits of competition.1 30 Whitfill claimed
she had lost customers to Roberts because he offered price incentives
that she could not match due to her higher prices.13 1
Examining the evidence, the court of appeals held that there was no
evidence showing how the alleged misconduct or Whitfill's alleged inju-
ries corresponded to an injury to either consumers or competition in the
marketplace. 132 Whitfill had testified that Roberts' company was her
only competition except in Tarrant and Dallas Counties. The evidence
showed that, at best, one other company sold a similar service using simi-
lar software, that the market was slowing at the time of trial, and that
Roberts' company had lost customers to another competitor.1 33 Without
much substantive discussion, or acknowledgement that the TFEAA does
not even have a price discrimination provision, the court of appeals con-
cluded that Whitfill had not suffered antitrust injury. 134 The court of ap-
peals noted that Whitfill and Roberts had a dispute and that Whitfill did
not make as much money as she expected when they divided their busi-
ness because she paid a "hosting fee" that Roberts was not required to
pay, but the court held that this did not constitute antitrust injury.135 Ab-
sent antitrust injury, Whitfill lacked antitrust standing, which deprived
the trial court of jurisdiction over her antitrust claim.1 36
126. Id.












III. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
The DTPA was enacted in 1973 "to protect consumers against false,
misleading and deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and
breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and economical procedures
to secure such protection."' 37 Noteworthy DTPA decisions during the
Survey period address the sufficiency of the evidence of a DTPA viola-
tion, preemption, and damages.
A. STANDING AND CONSUMER STATUS
In order to bring a DTPA claim, a plaintiff must be a "consumer" as
that term is defined in the statute. 138 To qualify as a consumer, the plain-
tiff must be an individual who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease,
goods or services; further, those goods or services must form the basis of
the plaintiff's complaint.139 Consumer status under the DTPA depends
upon a showing that the plaintiff's relationship to the transaction entitles
it to relief. 140 When the facts underlying the determination of consumer
status are undisputed, whether a plaintiff qualifies for such status is a
question of law.141
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas,
Wichita Falls Division, examined the definition of consumer in Marketic
v. U.S. Bank National Association.142 The plaintiff obtained a home eq-
uity loan from New Century Mortgage Corporation that was evidenced
by a promissory note. New Century obtained a first lien mortgage on the
plaintiff's property. The security instrument that created the lien pro-
vided that if the plaintiff defaulted on the promissory note, the note-
holder could accelerate the indebtedness and foreclose on the property.
Both the home equity note and the lien were subsequently assigned to
the defendant. The plaintiff failed to make several monthly payments
and the defendant accelerated her debt. The plaintiff filed suit seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the foreclosure. She also
sought damages for DTPA violations and violations of the Texas Debt
Collection Act ("TDCA"). 143
The defendant moved for summary judgment on the DTPA claim on
the ground that the plaintiff was not a consumer, arguing that the
137. DTPA § 17.44(a).
138. See id. § 17.50.
139. Id. § 17.45(4); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351-52 (Tex.
1987).
140. Amstadt v. United States Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 650 (Tex. 1996); see also
Sanchez v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 187 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a "DTPA
claim requires an underlying consumer transaction; there must be a nexus between the
consumer, the transaction, and the defendant's conduct") (citing Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at
650).
141. Vinson & Elkins v. Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381, 406 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1997, writ dism'd by agr.).
142. 436 F. Supp. 2d 842 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
143. Id. at 844-45.
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purchase of an intangible, such as a home equity loan, is not considered
the purchase of goods or services. The plaintiff responded that a viola-
tion of the TDCA also establishes a violation of the DTPA. The district
court acknowledged that the DTPA grants a private right of action under
the DTPA to one seeking to recover under the TDCA 144 but concluded
that section 17.50 does not exempt a plaintiff from the necessity of estab-
lishing consumer status under the DTPA.1 45 Because the defendants
were correct that the purchase of an intangible like a home equity loan is
not considered the purchase of goods or services under the DTPA, the
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the plain-
tiff's DTPA claim.1 4 6
The Lubbock Division of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas considered consumer status and standing in
Crawford v. GuideOne Mutual Insurance Co. 14 7 The case arose from an
alleged duty to defend Crawford under an insurance policy that the de-
fendant issued to Lubbock Christian University ("LCU"). The plaintiff
in the underlying state court litigation, Pliler, was injured during a prac-
tice for a school-sponsored and school-controlled entertainment event.
Pliler sued LCU for damages he suffered as a result of his injuries. LCU,
allegedly at the urging of its insurer, then filed a third-party claim against
others involved in the entertainment event, including Crawford. LCU's
President testified that he had "moral concerns" about the third-party
claim but was concerned that the insurer would "withdraw its support in
defending the Pliler suit." Crawford requested a defense under LCU's
insurance policy for the third-party claims but was not afforded one. 148
At trial of the Pliler lawsuit, the jury found LCU to be fifty-five percent
negligent, Pliler to be twenty-five percent negligent, and Crawford and
another individual each to be ten percent negligent.1 49 The jury also
found that Crawford had been acting for the benefit of LCU and subject
to LCU's control. 150 In its judgment, the trial court ordered that LCU
take nothing on its claims against Crawford. 1 51 Crawford then wrote to
the defendant demanding payment of the attorneys' fees and expenses
incurred in defending against the third-party claim. When no payment
was made, Crawford sued, alleging Insurance Code and DTPA violations.
The defendant then moved for summary judgment. 152
The district court first analyzed the insurance policy and the allegations
against Crawford in the state court suit and determined that Crawford
was neither an insured nor an intended third-party beneficiary under the
144. Id. at 854 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(h) (Vernon 2002 & Supp.
2006) and TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 392.404 (Vernon 2006)).
145. Marketic, 436 F. Supp. 2d at 855.
146. Id. at 854-55.
147. 420 F. Supp. 2d 584 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
148. Id. at 588-90.
149. Id. at 590.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 591.
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policy. Accordingly, the defendant had no duty to defend Crawford. 153
Citing Hamburger v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,15 4 the
district court held that in order to impose liability upon an insurer for
violations of the Texas Insurance Code and the DTPA, an insured must
show that it is entitled to recover for a breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing. 155 Because Crawford was not an insured, his claims
under the Insurance Code and DTPA failed. 156 Likewise, Crawford's
DTPA claims of unconscionable conduct and misrepresentation of goods
and services failed because he was not a consumer of the insurance pol-
icy.157 The district court held that Crawford's DTPA claim under section
17.46(b)( 12)158 did not require consumer status, but that summary judg-
ment nevertheless was appropriate because Crawford failed to produce
evidence that the defendant represented that the insurance policy in-
volved rights, remedies, or obligations that it did not have or involve.' 59
The district court thus granted summary judgment on all of Crawford's
DTPA claims. 160
Ortiz v. Collins 61 is another 2006 case in which the Houston Court of
Appeals for the Fourteenth District was called upon to address the plain-
tiff's status as a consumer. Collins and Welsh purchased a townhouse at a
trustee's foreclosure sale. Ortiz challenged the foreclosure but was una-
ble to prevent it. Collins and Welsh subsequently initiated a forcible-de-
tainer action. After their first attempt was unsuccessful, Collins and
Welsh hired Tyman, an attorney, to initiate a second forcible-detainer ac-
tion to seek possession of the townhouse. While the second detainer pro-
ceeding was pending, the parties began to negotiate in an attempt to
settle. The negotiations became the subject of another dispute, in which
Ortiz asserted fraud, negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel,
breach of contract, conspiracy, and DTPA claims against Collins, Welsh,
and their attorney Tyman.162 The trial court granted summary judgment
for the defendants disposing of all claims, and Ortiz appealed.' 63
One basis for summary judgment for Tyman was that Ortiz was not a
consumer of goods or services from Tyman. On appeal, Ortiz argued that
he was in fact a consumer of goods or services from Tyman by virtue of
the fact that the proposed settlement contemplated Ortiz buying back the
townhouse from Collins and Welsh, essentially arguing that this made the
153. Id. at 599.
154. 361 F.3d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 2004).
155. Crawford, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
156. Id. at 600.
157. Id.
158. Section 17.46(b)( 12) prohibits "representing that an agreement confers or in-
volves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are
prohibited by law." DTPA § 17.46(b)( 12).
159. 420 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
160. Id.
161. 203 S.W.3d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
162. Id. at 418-19.
163. Id. at 419.
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transaction a consumer transaction. 164 The court of appeals disagreed.
Citing settled law, the court of appeals recognized that Ortiz's status as a
consumer was dependent upon his relationship to the transaction and not
the contractual relationship of the parties. Privity of contract was not
required for Ortiz to maintain a DTPA claim against Tyman. 165 How-
ever, the court of appeals concluded that the relevant transaction was not
the sale or repurchase of the townhouse but, rather an attempt to settle
the forcible-detainer action. 166 The court of appeals went on to note that
negotiations to settle litigation do not constitute consumer transactions
even when the litigation involves goods.167 As the court of appeals ob-
served, if that were the case, every lawsuit stemming from a dispute over
the purchase or lease of goods or services would itself become a con-
sumer transaction. 68 Based on this analysis, the court of appeals con-
cluded that Ortiz was not a consumer and that the trial court had
properly granted Tyman's motion for summary judgment.169
B. DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
In addition to establishing consumer status, a DTPA plaintiff must
show that a "false, misleading, or deceptive act," breach of warranty, or
unconscionable action or course of action occurred, and that such con-
duct was the producing cause of the plaintiff's damage. 170
1. Laundry List Claims
DTPA section 17.46(b) contains, in 27 subparts, a nonexclusive "laun-
dry list" of actions that constitute "false, misleading or deceptive acts"
under the statute. 71 Several interesting cases involving laundry-list
claims were decided during the Survey period.
In Main Place Custom Homes, Inc. v. Honaker,1 72 the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals decided a homeowners' suit against a builder in connec-
tion with property damages caused by a slope failure and related soil
movement on the homeowners' property. The builder purchased the lot
and built a custom luxury home on the property. The Honakers became
interested in the home while it was under construction but were con-
cerned about a steep embankment behind the home. The builder repeat-
edly assured the Honakers that the "house and lot [are] as solid as they
come," and that the property "was stable and .. . there would be no
problems with the house or property falling away.' 73 The Honakers






170. DTPA § 17.50(a)( 1)-( 3).
171. Id. § 17.46(b).
172. 192 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
173. Id. at 610.
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agreed to purchase the home and later testified that they relied on the
builder's statements in making their decision. During the remaining con-
struction, the builder also provided the homeowners with two letters,
both of which opined that the retaining wall was strong enough to with-
stand the pressure of the built-up foundation. 174
Less than two years after the Honakers closed on the property, the soil
on the south side of the foundation began cracking and pulling away from
the back porch. The builder inspected the cracking and told the
Honakers that it was not a problem and to fill the area with sand. Three
months later, the slope behind the home failed and caused a major land-
slide. The builder inspected the damage and told the Honakers that the
slope failure would not damage the home; however, over the next several
months, the property sustained damage related to the slope failure. The
Honakers also discovered that the home's sprinkler system had been im-
properly connected to the city water system, which caused thousands of
gallons of water to leak under the home. The Honakers learned that the
water leakage, coupled with the home having been built at the joining of
two different types of soil, caused the movement in the soil under the
home. The Honakers sued the builder, the initial developers of the prop-
erty, a contractor who repaired the retaining wall, the subcontractor that
installed the sprinkler system, and their homeowners' insurance com-
pany. The Honakers settled with everyone except the builder. After a
bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the Honakers and rendered
judgment awarding damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney's fees
for both the trial and any appeals. 175
The builder appealed, arguing that the evidence was legally and factu-
ally insufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the builder
violated the DTPA. Specifically, the builder claimed that its statements
to the Honakers were merely statements of opinion, not misrepresenta-
tions of fact. The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that the
builder's statements affirmatively represented that the property was sta-
ble and able to support the house when it was not.176 In reaching this
conclusion, the court of appeals noted that a determination of whether a
statement is an opinion or an actionable misrepresentation requires con-
sideration of three factors: the specificity of the statement, "the compara-
tive knowledge of the buyer and seller, and whether the representation
relates to a past or current event or condition versus a future event or
condition.1 77 Applying these factors to the evidence, the court of ap-
peals held that the statements were specific, that the builder was in a
better position to know about the condition of the property than the
Honakers, and that the statements applied equally to the present and fu-
174. Id. at 610-11.
175. Id. at 610-12.
176. Id. at 624-25.
177. Id. at 624 (citing Kessler v. Fanning, 953 S.W.2d 515, 520 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1997, no pet.)).
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ture condition of the home and property.178 The court of appeals thus
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's
finding that the builder violated the DTPA. 179
Reynolds v. Murphy180 involved "the potential liability of an author
and publisher of an investment-related newsletter to a subscriber who
allege[d] that he incurred losses as a result of making investments in ac-
cordance with recommendations in the newsletter."'1 81 The subscriber al-
leged that he relied on and attempted to follow the information in the
newsletter in making his investment decisions. He became concerned
about the advice in the newsletter because the returns on his investments
did not match what the newsletter described. He eventually sold those
investments at a loss and sued the author and publisher for breach of
contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud and misrepresen-
tation, and violations of the DTPA. The investor claimed that the de-
fendants had misrepresented the author's level of experience, skill, and
expertise in technology investments and erroneously represented that the
author personally researched the companies in which he advised investing
and "would safely guide investors so they could invest and make profits
safely. ' 182 The investor also alleged that the defendants made misrepre-
sentations about the author's investment methodology, including state-
ments that the methodology was proven and "based on highly reliable
principles" and that investors who followed it "would realize great re-
turns on investments. '183 The investor also alleged that the defendants
failed to disclose the author's criminal history. The defendants filed no-
evidence and traditional motions for summary judgment, arguing that
none of their statements could support a DTPA claim. The trial court
granted the motions and the investor appealed. 184
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals first examined the evidence relating
to the author's skill and expertise as a stock analyst. The defendants'
summary judgment evidence demonstrated that the author had been in-
volved in stock analysis since the late 1960s and included excerpts from
books and articles identifying the author as an expert and ranking his
model portfolio as fifth best among seventy-seven newsletters. In re-
sponse, the investor provided evidence that he claimed showed that the
author was a failure at analyzing and picking technology stocks. The
court of appeals determined that, while there was evidence that the au-
thor may have had poor returns pursuant to aggressive or short-term
methods he advocated in other contexts, in the newsletter in question, the
author consistently emphasized a different, long-term investment ap-
proach and explained that the investment funds he managed were sepa-
178. Id. at 624-25.
179. Id. at 625.
180. 188 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
181. Id. at 256-57.
182. Id. at 272.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 258.
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rate from, and more aggressive than, the investments recommended in
the newsletter. The court of appeals concluded that the investor's evi-
dence did not raise a fact issue as to his claims relating to the author's
expertise and skill.185
The court of appeals also held that the investor did not raise a fact issue
on his claim under DTPA section 17.46(b)( 8), which forbids using false
or misleading facts to disparage the goods, services, or business of an-
other.186 The investor based this allegation on statements by the author
that he had a "wall of shame" for analysts who were poor performers and
that another analyst was headed to hell because of his stock picks. The
court of appeals held that section 17.46(b)( 8) applies to misrepresenta-
tions of fact, not opinion, and that the statements at issue were state-
ments of opinion.187 Finally, the court of appeals rejected the investor's
claim that the defendants had violated DTPA section 17.46(b)( 24) by
failing to disclose the author's past history for the purpose of inducing
subscriptions to the newsletter.188 Section 17.46(b)( 24) prohibits "failing
to disclose information concerning goods or services which was known at
the time of the transaction if such failure to disclose such information was
intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the con-
sumer would not have entered had the information been disclosed. '189
Included in the defendants' summary judgment evidence were affidavits
in which they maintained that they did not intend anyone to rely on the
absence of information about the author's past in deciding whether to
subscribe to the newsletter. The court of appeals concluded that sum-
mary judgment was proper because the investor failed to present any evi-
dence raising a fact issue as to the defendants' intent in failing to disclose
the information. 190
The Dallas Court of Appeals considered the sufficiency of the evidence
of a DTPA violation in Dal-Chrome Co. v. Brenntag Southwest, Inc.' 91
Dal-Chrome purchased sulfuric acid from Brenntag. After determining
that the acid had been contaminated, Dal-Chrome sued, and the jury
found that Brenntag had violated the DTPA by misrepresenting the qual-
ity and characteristics of the sulfuric acid. 192
Brenntag appealed, arguing that the evidence was legally and factually
insufficient to support the jury's findings that it violated the DTPA. Ac-
cording to Brenntag, it represented that the sulfuric acid would be tech
grade ninety-three percent; it in fact delivered tech grade ninety percent
sulfuric acid, and there was no evidence that the acid varied from the
manufacturer's specifications. According to the Dallas Court of Appeals'
185. Id. at 274.
186. Id. at 274-75.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 275.
189. DTPA § 17.46(b)( 24).
190. Reynolds, 188 S.W.3d at 274-75.
191. 183 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
192. Id. at 136.
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review of the evidence, Brenntag represented to Dal-Chrome that the
acid would meet the manufacturer's product specifications, but
Brenntag's quality control procedures involved obtaining a certificate of
compliance from the supplier and not independent testing to determine
whether the acid met product specifications. Brenntag presented evi-
dence that it was common industry practice to rely on such certificates,
but the record also established that the acid sold to Dal-Chrome was con-
taminated. The court of appeals concluded that there was sufficient evi-
dence to conclude that Brenntag represented that the acid had
characteristics, ingredients, uses, or benefits that it did not have, or that
the acid was of a particular standard, quality, or grade when it was of
another. 193 The court of appeals rejected Brenntag's argument that, ab-
sent evidence of the manufacturer's specifications, there was no evidence
that Brenntag represented the acid would not be contaminated. 94 The
court of appeals also held that based on Brenntag's reliance on the sup-
plier's certification, coupled with evidence that Brenntag represented to
Dal-Chrome that the certificates were the manufacturer's specifications
and the fact that the acid did not meet the specifications in the certifi-
cates, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Brenntag's represen-
tations were false. 195 Although there were some conflicts in the
testimony, the court of appeals affirmed the verdict, holding that it could
not substitute its judgment for the jury's and that the evidence was both
legally and factually sufficient.' 96
In Lundstrom v. United Services Automobile Association-CIC,19 7
homeowners sued their insurer for wrongfully denying coverage for water
and mold damage. The insurer moved for summary judgment, arguing
that the homeowners' extra-contractual claims, including their DTPA
claims, were barred because a good-faith dispute existed regarding cover-
age. The trial court granted the motion and the homeowners appealed. 198
The Houston Court of Appeals first affirmed summary judgment on the
homeowners' breach of contract claim, holding that the insurance policy
did not cover mold damage under the facts alleged.' 99 The court of ap-
peals then recognized that an insured does not have a claim for bad faith
when an insurer has denied a claim that is not covered and has not other-
wise breached the contract, unless, in denying the claim, the insurer com-
mitted an act so extreme that it caused an injury independent of the
policy claim. Because the policy did not cover the damage at issue and
the homeowners had not alleged any act extreme enough to cause an
injury independent of the insurer's denial of the claim, the court of ap-
peals held that the homeowners' bad-faith claim failed as a matter of
193. Id. at 141-42.
194. Id. at 142.
195. Id. at 140.
196. Id. at 139-141.
197. 192 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
198. Id. at 80.
199. Id. at 95.
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law.200 The court of appeals then reviewed the pleadings and summary
judgment arguments and concluded that the homeowners' DTPA claim
was premised on the same underlying theory as their bad-faith claim and
that in disproving the bad-faith claim, the insurer also disproved the
DTPA claim.201 The Houston Court of Appeals thus affirmed summary
judgment against the homeowners on both claims. 202
Daugherty v. Jacobs203 involved a dispute over repair and restoration
work on a 1960 Jaguar. Daugherty and his repair shop K&K estimated
the cost of the work at $16,165, predicted a two to three month timeline,
and extended a one-year warranty. But K&K worked on the car for nine
months, and the cost came to approximately $30,000. In late 2000, K&K
informed Jacobs that his Jaguar was ready, but the repairs were not actu-
ally completed. Jacobs refused to take possession of the car. K&K kept
the car several more months and billed Jacobs an additional $6,000.
When Jacobs finally picked up the car, he discovered that many of the
problems still had not been resolved and stopped payment on his final
check to K&K. Jacobs then took the car to another repair shop to com-
plete the work. While the car was there, K&K took possession of the car
pursuant to a mechanic's lien and held it until Jacobs agreed to repay the
stopped check plus attorneys' fees and interest. K&K agreed to honor
the warranty but charged Jacobs for additional work and parts, which Ja-
cobs believed should have been included under the warranty. Jacobs
eventually paid approximately $10,000 to yet another repair shop to com-
plete the work to his satisfaction and then sued Daugherty and K&K,
alleging negligence, breach of contract, DTPA violations, fraud, breach of
warranty, and breach of bailment and conversion. After trial, the jury
found in Jacobs' favor on all claims.204
Daugherty appealed, arguing in part that there was insufficient evi-
dence that he had engaged in a false, misleading, or deceptive act that
was a producing cause of Jacobs' damages. The Houston Court of Ap-
peals first explained that Daugherty, as K&K's agent, could be held per-
sonally liable under the DTPA for misrepresentations he personally
made. The court of appeals then considered the evidence that Daugherty
told Jacobs that K&K was the best in Houston, and perhaps the best in
the country, for repairing Jaguars, that Jacobs would have a one-year war-
ranty on the work, and that the work would take two to three months and
cost approximately $16,000. Jacobs testified he relied on these represen-
tations and that for the majority of time the Jaguar was at K&K, he
thought things were going fine. Jacobs' expert testified about the repairs
still needed after K&K allegedly completed its work and that K&K com-
pleted repairs in the wrong order, using wrong procedures. The expert
opined that the repairs were not completed in the manner in which they
200. Id. at 96-97.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 80.
203. 187 S.W.3d 607 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
204. Id. at 612-13.
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were charged and that the invoices seemed made up. He further testified
that Jacobs had been overcharged and received substandard work. The
court of appeals concluded that Jacobs had produced ample evidence that
the faulty and incomplete repairs and false invoicing caused him dam-
ages.205 Although the defendants pointed to a break in the causal con-
nection due to the passage of time between the repairs made at K&K and
the expert's observations of the Jaguar and argued that any work to re-
build the engine was outside the original estimate, the court of appeals
held that the jury was within its province to disbelieve the defendants'
alternate theory of causation.20 6 The court of appeals thus affirmed the
jury's verdict in Jacobs' favor.20 7
Pierce v. State208 involved complaints by customers of a floral shop con-
cerning unauthorized charges on their credit and debit cards.209 The cus-
tomers complained to Pierce and sought reimbursements, but Pierce was
unresponsive to most of the complaints. After receiving several com-
plaints about Pierce, the Texas Attorney General sued, alleging that
Pierce violated the DTPA by placing unauthorized charges on the cus-
tomers' credit cards, falsely representing to credit card companies that
the customers had approved the charges, and inducing customers into
transactions by failing to disclose that Pierce or her employees might
make unauthorized charges on the customers' cards. The State sought a
temporary restraining order with asset freeze, which the trial court
granted. 210
Pierce appealed, arguing that the Attorney General lacked standing to
bring the suit because making unauthorized charges on customers' credit
cards is not a service within the meaning of the DTPA or an unlawful
practice under the DTPA. The Dallas Court of Appeals disagreed.211
The court of appeals held that allowing customers to pay with credit cards
is part of the service that Pierce provided and that, without a sales trans-
action, the deception would not have occurred.212 The court of appeals
concluded that the allegations that Pierce made unauthorized charges on
the customers' credit cards and that the customers would not have pur-
chased flowers from Pierce had they known that unauthorized charges
would follow constituted deceptive acts involving a service and a sales
transaction that were actionable under the DTPA, and therefore, the At-
torney General had standing to bring the sUit.2 13 The court of appeals
thus affirmed the temporary injunction.21 4
205. Id. at 615.
206. Id.
207. Id. 615-16, 620.
208. 184 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 304-05.
211. Id. at 304.
212. Id. at 305-06.
213. Id. at 306.
214. Id. at 305-06.
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In Mays v. Pierce,215 the plaintiff signed a contract and work order for
the defendant to perform water and mold remediation and restoration on
the plaintiff's home.2 16 After instructing the plaintiff to leave her home
immediately due to the presence of toxic mold, the defendant decon-
structed the residence but failed to repair or reconstruct the home. The
plaintiff subsequently sued for breach of contract and violations of the
DTPA.217 The plaintiff alleged both false, misleading, and deceptive acts
or practices under the laundry list as well as an unconscionable course of
action.218 The case was tried to the bench, and a judgment was entered
against the defendant for over $43,000 in actual damages and additional
DTPA damages in the same amount.2 19 The defendant appealed the legal
and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting liability and
damages. 220
The Houston Court of Appeals reversed the portion of the judgment
awarding DTPA damages.22 1 The defendant argued, and the court of ap-
peals agreed, that the plaintiff's evidence, at best, demonstrated a breach
of contract. The court of appeals explained that the determination of
whether a breach of contract gives rise to the level of a misrepresentation
sufficient to trigger a DTPA violation is a fact-intensive inquiry. 222 The
court of appeals further explained that whether the facts, once deter-
mined, constitute a DTPA violation is a question of law.2 23 Ultimately,
the court of appeals concluded that the evidence presented by the plain-
tiff demonstrated a breach of contract but was not actionable under the
DTPA.224
Patterson v. McMickle225 addressed whether intent is required for a
DTPA claim. The plaintiff asserted claims, including a DTPA claim,
against an annuity broker. The broker was successful in dismissing all of
the claims on summary judgment. 226
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the broker was not entitled to sum-
mary judgment on the DTPA claim because there was a fact issue as to
whether the broker failed to disclose information to the plaintiff, despite
a duty to do so in violation of section 17.46(b)( 24).227 The Fort Worth
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that mere nondisclosure of material
information is not enough to establish an actionable DTPA claim. 228
Rather, a plaintiff is required to provide some evidence that the defen-
215. 203 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
216. Id. at 569.
217. Id. at 570.
218. Id. at 571.
219. Id. at 568.
220. Id. at 569.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 574.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 575.
225. 191 S.W.3d 819 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.).
226. Id. at 821-22.
227. Id. at 827.
228. Id.
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dant withheld information with the intent of inducing the consumer into
the transaction. 229 As the plaintiff failed to present any such evidence,
summary judgment was proper.230
2. Unconscionability
DTPA section 17.45(5) defines an "unconscionable action or course of
action" as "an act or practice which, to a consumer's detriment, takes
advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of the
consumer to a grossly unfair degree."'2 3' In Daugherty v. Jacobs,232 dis-
cussed above, a dissatisfied car owner sued K&K repair shop alleging that
K&K and its owner Daugherty violated the DTPA by engaging in an un-
conscionable action or course of action. After the car's owner prevailed
at trial, Daugherty appealed. The owner had testified that he did not
receive any details about the work performed over the course of the thir-
teen months until litigation began and that the backup of the invoices did
not match the work allegedly done. There also was evidence that Daugh-
erty double-charged Jacobs for some services, charged repeatedly for
work that was never done, and charged for what appeared to be his own
errors. The owner's expert testified that there was no way that the owner
could have understood the erroneous invoices. The Houston Court of
Appeals held that, based upon this record, the jury's verdict was "not so
contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence
as to be clearly wrong and unjust. 2 33
The plaintiff in Strauss v. Ford Motor Co.234 brought a putative class
action against Ford and a car leasing company alleging that they were
distributing cars "wholly incapable" of compliance with the Texas Trans-
portation Code because they lacked hardware necessary to affix a front
license plate to the bumper. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants'
actions constituted an unconscionable course of action in violation of the
DTPA. The defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)( 6). The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, granted the motions. 235 The
court of appeals acknowledged that under Texas law, unconscionable
conduct is more than conduct that takes unfair advantage of the con-
sumer; it requires conduct that takes advantage of the consumer to a
"'glaringly noticeable, flagrant, complete and unmitigated"' degree. 236
The district court concluded that, even taking the plaintiff's allegations as
true, an allegation "that the defendants sold him a car that makes it
somewhat inconvenient to comply with Texas law" did not meet this
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon 2006).
232. 187 S.W.3d 607 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
233. Id. at 616-17.
234. 439 F. Supp. 2d 680 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
235. Id. at 682.
236. Id. at 687 (quoting Chastain v. Koonce, 700 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1985)).
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In Mays v. Pierce,238 discussed above, the plaintiff alleged an uncon-
scionable action or course of conduct. The defendant appealed the entry
of a judgment following a bench trial, challenging the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the judgment 239 The Houston
Court of Appeals explained that while a plaintiff need not prove reliance
or a specific misrepresentation to establish a claim based on unconsciona-
bility, the court must examine the entire transaction to determine
whether the defendant took advantage of the plaintiff to a grossly unfair
degree. 240 The court of appeals then examined the record and concluded
that there was no evidence that the defendant did not follow through on
his representations or contractual obligations, nor evidence of an inten-
tion by the defendant not to perform when the representations were
made. 241 The court of appeals went on to explain that, when the evidence
in the record is so weak as to merely create a suspicion of the existence of
a fact, it constitutes no evidence. 2 42 Relying on this standard, the court of
appeals reversed the finding of an unconscionable act.243
C. DETERMINING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A prevailing plaintiff in a DTPA action may recover economic dam-
ages.244 In cases involving misrepresentation, the plaintiff may recover
under either the "out-of-pocket" or "benefit-of-the-bargain" measure of
damages, whichever gives the plaintiff a greater recovery.245 Out-of-
pocket damages measure the difference between what the buyer paid and
the value of what he received.2 46 Benefit-of-the-bargain damages mea-
sure the difference between the value of the goods or services as repre-
sented and the value as received.2 47 If the trier of fact finds that the
defendant acted "knowingly," the plaintiff also may recover damages for
mental anguish and statutory damages up to three times the amount of
economic damages.2 48
1. Actual Damages
The Houston Court of Appeals considered the damages available to
remedy an insurer's DTPA violation in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Sulli-
van.2 49 The plaintiff homeowners' home had several leaks that led to
237. Id. at 687-88.
238. 203 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
239. Id. at 569.
240. Id. at 571.
241. Id. at 573.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 575.
244. DTPA § 17.50(b)( 1).
245. Leyendecker & Assocs. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex. 1984).
246. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 817 (Tex. 1997).
247. Id.
248. Leyendecker & Assocs., 683 S.W.2d at 372.
249. 192 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
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mold contamination. After initially estimating the loss as less than
$5,000, the insurer's adjuster requested additional testing on the resi-
dence, which revealed the scope of the contamination. The insurer then
issued checks to the homeowners in excess of $82,000. The homeowners
were not satisfied with the payments and sued the insurer, alleging that
their home's condition had deteriorated due to the delay and mishandling
of their claims. At trial, the jury found that the insurer breached the
dwelling coverage portion of the policy, but not the personal property
and additional living expenses coverage provisions, and awarded damages
for mold remediation, repair of the home, and personal property
damage. 250
The insurer appealed, arguing in part that the homeowners could not
recover for personal property damage because the jury did not find that
the insurer breached the personal property coverage portion of the policy
or that the homeowners' loss was caused by a covered, named peril. The
homeowners responded that there was a single contract that the jury
found was breached, that the trial court properly disregarded the jury's
finding of no breach of the personal property section of the contract, and
that it was an error to submit the breach question in three parts. The
Houston Court of Appeals examined the contract and concluded that the
insurer could have breached the dwelling section of the policy without
breaching the personal property section because the contract was an all-
risk policy as to the dwelling but personal property coverage was limited
to damages caused by specifically named perils.251 Because the jury did
not find a breach of the personal property section of the policy, and even
found that the personal property damage was caused by excluded perils,
and because DTPA liability related to breach of an insurance policy is
contingent on a finding of coverage, the jury's finding of personal prop-
erty damages was immaterial and should have been disregarded. The
court of appeals also held that personal property damages could not be
premised directly on the insurer's handling of the homeowners' claims
because the jury did not find that the insurer had made any material mis-
representations relating to coverage, represented that work or services
had been performed when they had not, or breached its duty of good
faith and fair dealing.252
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied a statutory-standing analysis
in Everett v. TK-Taito, L.L. C.253 to determine whether a putative class of
automobile purchasers had standing to assert a DTPA claim. The Ever-
etts sued the defendants on behalf of themselves and others similarly situ-
ated based on the production and sale of allegedly defective seat belt
buckles. The Everetts alleged that their vehicles came factory-equipped
with buckles which had a propensity to only partially engage, that Mr.
250. Id. at 101-03.
251. Id. at 107.
252. Id. at 108.
253. 178 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
2007]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Everett was injured by a defective buckle but did not seek damages for
his injuries, and that Ms. Everett's buckles had not failed or caused in-
jury. They also claimed that the defendants had made false representa-
tions concerning the buckles, that they relied upon the representations,
and that the allegedly deceptive acts were a producing cause of damages
because they did not receive the benefit of their bargain. They did not
allege that their buckles ever partially engaged, provided them with insuf-
ficient restraint, or came unlatched while they were driving. The trial
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that the
Everetts lacked standing because they failed to allege injury in fact.254
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Everetts
had failed to plead facts demonstrating compensable injury.255 The court
of appeals began its analysis by considering the distinction between mani-
fested product defects and unmanifested product defects, and concluding
that the Everetts had alleged an unmanifested defect.256 The Texas Su-
preme Court has not addressed a standing analysis for a plaintiff alleging
an unmanifested product defect that causes only economic damages, so
the Fort Worth Court of Appeals examined the facts pleaded and the
cause of action asserted.257 Because the Everetts' seat belt buckles
latched and provided sufficient restraint and the Everetts did not identify
any way in which the buckles in their vehicles performed differently from
how the defendants represented they would perform or otherwise dif-
fered from how they were represented, the court of appeals concluded
that the Everetts had received the benefit of their bargain.258 The court
of appeals held that, "[a]t some point, potential loss-of-benefit-of-the-
bargain injuries and potential cost-of-repair or replacement injuries from
a defect that has not manifested itself simply become too remote in time
to constitute an 'injury' for statutory standing purposes under the
DTPA. ''259 In the absence of pleaded facts comprising an allegation of an
economic injury, the court of appeals held that the Everetts lacked statu-
tory standing to assert a DTPA claim. 260
2. Additional Damages for "Knowing" Conduct
In Main Place Custom Homes, Inc. v. Honaker,261 discussed above,
homeowners successfully sued a builder for damages caused by a slope
failure and related soil movement on their property. On appeal, the
builder argued that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to
support a finding that it committed one of the "laundry-list" violations
knowingly. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals observed that the home-
254. Id. at 848-50, 852.
255. Id. at 849.
256. Id. at 857.
257. Id. at 852-53.
258. Id. at 858.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 852-53, 857-59.
261. 192 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
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owners testified at trial that they did not believe the builder's representa-
tive made any statements to them that he did not believe to be true when
made.262 The representative testified that, in making his statements, he
relied on engineering reports that he obtained from the developer. Al-
though there was evidence that at least one of those reports raised con-
cerns about the stability of the property, there was no evidence that
simply reading the reports would alert a non-engineer to the stability
problems. The court of appeals therefore concluded that there was no
evidence to support the trial court's finding that appellants "knowingly"
violated the DTPA. 263
In Dal-Chrome Co. v. Brenntag Southwest, Inc.,264 discussed above, a
purchaser of contaminated sulfuric acid alleged that the seller knowingly
led it to believe that the seller's quality-control measures would ensure
that the acid complied with the manufacturer's specifications. The seller
argued that there was insufficient evidence of a knowing violation be-
cause its quality-control efforts met or exceeded the industry's standard
practices. The Dallas Court of Appeals acknowledged evidence that the
seller took steps to avoid contamination and evidence that the seller's
procedures would not disclose whether the acid was contaminated. There
also was evidence that the seller represented that it would stand behind
the acid if anything was wrong with it but failed to disclose the results of
post-customer complaint testing of the acid until after it was sued. Fi-
nally, the seller's regional manager testified that it did promise that every
product it sold would meet the manufacturer's specifications and that the
seller's product brochure stated that "all products . . .delivered to cus-
tomers must meet the manufacturer's specifications. ' 265 Based on this
evidence, the court concluded that a jury could reasonably infer that the
seller had actual awareness of the falsity, deception, or unfairness of its
conduct at the time of the conduct.266
American Title Co. of Houston v. BOMAC Mortgage Holdings, L.P.267
arose out of a dispute involving a refinanced mortgage. The plaintiff sold
the mortgage to a third party prior to the debtor's default and was re-
quired to pay off the debt. The plaintiff then sued the title company in-
volved in the transaction for breach of contract, fraud, and violations of
the DTPA. After a bifurcated jury trial, the trial court entered a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff that awarded both actual and additional
damages under the DTPA; the defendant appealed.268
262. Id. at 626.
263. Id. at 625-26.
264. 183 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
265. Id. at 142.
266. Id. at 141-42. See also Daugherty v. Jacobs, 187 S.W.3d 607, 618 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding that repair shop owner's testimony that he
reviewed every invoice before sending it, coupled with expert testimony about the mis-
takes, overcharges, and duplications on the invoices, provided sufficient evidence that the
defendant acted knowingly).
267. 196 S.W.3d 903 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.).
268. Id. at 906-07.
2007]
SMU LAW REVIEW
One of the issues on appeal was whether the trial court properly bifur-
cated the issue of additional damages under the DTPA.269 The Dallas
Court of Appeals first explained that on a motion by a defendant in an
action with a claim for exemplary damages, the trial court shall bifurcate
the trial, reserving determination of the amount of exemplary damages
for the second phase. 270 The court of appeals then explained that addi-
tional damages under the DTPA are exemplary damages, and concluded
that it was proper for the trial court to bifurcate the additional damages
portion of the trial.2 71
D. EXEMPTIONS, DEFENSES, AND LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY
The DTPA has been characterized as a "strict-liability" statute, requir-
ing only proof of a misrepresentation, without regard to the offending
party's intent.272 This is only partially correct, since several DTPA provi-
sions expressly require proof of intentional conduct.273 Some courts have
gone so far as to hold that common-law defenses, such as estoppel and
ratification, are unavailable to defend against DTPA claims.274 Other
courts have recognized a variety of DTPA defenses. 275 Additionally,
both the courts and the legislature have carved out exemptions from the
DTPA's reach.
1. Preemption and Exemption From the DTPA
Certain statutory schemes and common-law doctrines bar DTPA
claims, either expressly or by implication, or affect a plaintiff's proce-
dures for bringing DTPA claims.
a. Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act
Pursuant to the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement
Act ("MLIIA"), a plaintiff bringing a "health care liability claim" must
file an expert report within a specified time after filing suit.276 If no ex-
269. Id. at 912-13.
270. Id. at 912-13 (citing TEX. Civ. PAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.009(c), (d) (Vernon
2006)).
271. Id. at 913.
272. See, e.g., White Budd Van Ness P'ship v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Venture, 798
S.W.2d 805, 809 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ dism'd).
273. See, e.g., DTPA § 17.46(b)( 9), (10), (13), (17) & (24).
274. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 928 S.W.2d 133, 154 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part, 981 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1998); see also Smith v.
Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980) (recognizing that a primary purpose of the DTPA
is to relieve consumers of the burden of overcoming common law defenses while providing
a cause of action for misrepresentation).
275. See, e.g., Ostrow v. United Bus. Mach., Inc., 982 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) ("We hold a DTPA claim arising out of a contract may be
barred by accord and satisfaction."); Johnson v. McLeaish, No. 05-94-01673-CV, 1995 WL
500308, at *10 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied) (applying illegality/public policy af-
firmative defense to DTPA claims); Keriotis v. Lombardo Rental Trust, 607 S.W.2d 44, 46
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e) (applying statute of frauds to DTPA claims).
276. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (Vernon 2006).
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pert report is served by that time, on proper motion by the defendant, the
trial court is required to dismiss the action with prejudice and award the
defendant its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 277
The Dallas Court of Appeals examined this requirement in Boothe v.
Dixon.278 Dixon alleged that following laser eye surgery by Boothe, his
eyesight initially improved but then deteriorated. Boothe then per-
formed "touch up" laser surgery, but Dixon's vision further deteriorated.
Boothe assured Dixon that approval was forthcoming on an abrasion pro-
cedure that would solve Dixon's problem, but, when Dixon sought the
procedure, he was told that Boothe did not see patients after one year.
Dixon subsequently learned that he had not been a candidate for either
surgery and that, due to the surgeries, could not have the abrasion proce-
dure. Dixon sued alleging that Boothe had violated the DTPA by, among
other things, misrepresenting the availability of future medical proce-
dures and making false or misleading statements concerning the need for
corrective surgery. Boothe moved for dismissal and summary judgment
on the DTPA claim on the ground that Dixon had failed to file an expert
report within the deadline required by MLIIA. The trial court denied
both motions and Boothe appealed.279
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the suit.280 The
court of appeals first held that the expert report requirements apply to all
health care liability claims. 281 The applicable version of the MLIIA de-
fined "health care liability claim" as:
a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treat-
ment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted
standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or
administrative services directly related to health care, which proxi-
mately results in injury to or death of a claimant, whether the claim-
ant's claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract.282
"Health care" also is a defined term and includes "any act or treatment
performed or furnished.., by any health care provider. '28 3 The determi-
nation of whether a cause of action falls under the definition of a health
care liability claim requires examination of the claim's underlying nature.
"If the act or omission alleged in the complaint is an inseparable part of
the rendition of health care services, or if it is based on a breach of a
standard of care applicable to health care providers, then the claim is a
health care liability claim."'284 The Dallas Court of Appeals agreed with
Boothe's argument that Dixon's claims were intertwined with Boothe's
277. Id.
278. 180 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
279. Id. at 916-18.
280. Id. at 916.
281. Id. at 919.
282. Id. at 918 (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)( 13) (Vernon
2005 & Supp. 2006)).
283. Id. (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)( 10) (Vernon 2005 &
Supp. 2006)).
284. Id. at 919.
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rendition of medical services because proving that Boothe's diagnoses
and treatment were to Dixon's detriment would require Dixon to provide
proof of his medical condition before and after the laser surgeries and in
relation to custom abrasion, and proof that Boothe undertook a treat-
ment that a reasonable and prudent doctor would not undertake under
the same or similar circumstances. 285 The court of appeals concluded that
such proof would require expert medical testimony.286 The court of ap-
peals rejected Dixon's argument that statements amounting to specific
promises of cure or a particular result are actionable under the DTPA,
holding that Boothe's alleged representations related to a possible future
procedure that was never performed and were insufficiently specific to
form a knowing misrepresentation or breach of warranty regarding the
results of treatment.287 The court of appeals concluded that Dixon's
claims met the statutory definition of a "health care liability claim" and
thus were subject to the MLIIA expert report requirement.288 The court
of appeals reversed the trial court's order denying Boothe's motions and
rendered judgment in Boothe's favor.289
b. The Warsaw Convention
During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit, in a matter 'of first impres-
sion, considered the preemptive scope of the Warsaw Convention 290 in
Mbaba v. Societe Air France.291 "The 'cardinal purpose' of the Warsaw
Convention 'is to achieve uniformity of rules governing claims arising
from international air transportation."' 292 The convention applies to the
commercial aircraft transportation of passengers and goods and provides
that "any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought sub-
ject to the conditions and limits set out in this Convention. '293
The plaintiff in Mbaba was charged more than $4,000 in excess baggage
fees. He sued the airline, asserting several state-law claims, including
DTPA violations, and the airline moved for summary judgment. The dis-
trict court granted the motion, holding that the Warsaw Convention pre-
empted the plaintiff's state-law claims.294 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
considered the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in El Al
Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng.295 In Tseng, the Supreme Court
reviewed a previous version of the Warsaw Convention to determine the
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 920.
288. Id. at 921.
289. Id. at 919-21.
290. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 879 (1934) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
291. 457 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2006).
292. Id. at 497 (quoting El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 523 U.S. 155
(1999)).
293. Warsaw Convention, supra note 290, art. 29.
294. Mbaba, 457 F.3d at 500.
295. 523 U.S. 155 (1999).
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effect of the Convention on a plaintiff's claims for psychic and psychoso-
matic injuries. The Supreme Court found that the Warsaw Convention
did address psychological injuries and concluded that recovery for a per-
sonal injury not addressed by the Convention was unavailable.296 The
Supreme Court held that providing plaintiffs with recourse to local law
would undermine the Warsaw Convention's goal of uniformity.297 Ap-
plying the Supreme Court's analysis, the Fifth Circuit concluded that be-
cause Mbaba's claims did not fall within the language of the Warsaw
Convention, they were preempted by the Convention and were not ac-
tionable.2 98 The Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court's grant
of summary judgment.299
c. The Texas Residential Construction Liability Act
In Gentry v. Squires Construction, Inc.,300 the Dallas Court of Appeals
considered whether the Texas Residential Construction Liability Act
("TRCLA") 301 preempted the DTPA. The Gentrys hired Squires Con-
struction to build a house. Under the parties' contract, Squires would
receive payment by submitting draw requests to the lender. The Gentrys
refused to authorize payment for Squires' final draw request, complaining
of numerous construction defects. Squires sued the Gentrys, who re-
sponded with various claims against Squires including DTPA violations.
After a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Squires
and denied all relief requested by the Gentrys. The trial court ruled that
the Gentrys' DTPA claims were preempted by the TRCLA. Both parties
appealed. 30 2
Citing to the Beaumont Court of Appeals' decision in Sanders v. Con-
struction Equity, Inc.,303 the Dallas Court of Appeals acknowledged that
the RCLA provides notice provisions, defenses, and limitations on dam-
ages, encourages settlement, and determines the standard of causation for
residential construction disputes. The court of appeals concluded, how-
ever, that while the TRCLA "modifies causes of action for damages re-
sulting from construction defects in residences by limiting and controlling
causes of action that otherwise exist," it does not create a cause of ac-
tion.30 4 The TRCLA does not provide a structure for liability, contain a
description of what conduct will result in liability, or contain an express
statement of the elements of a cause of action. 30 5 Furthermore, the TR-
CLA and the DTPA expressly refer to each other. The TRCLA provides
296. Id. at 161.
297. Id.
298. Mbaba, 457 F.3d at 497.
299. Id. at 500-01.
300. 188 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
301. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001 et seq. (Vernon 2006).
302. Id. at 400-02.
303. 42 S.W.3d 364, 370 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, pet. denied).




that it prevails over any conflict between it and the DTPA306 and that the
"inspection and repair provisions of the TRCLA are in addition to any
rights of inspection and settlement provided by common law or by an-
other statute, including Section 17.505 [of the DTPA]. ' '307 Similarly, the
DTPA provides that the TRCLA "prevails over this subchapter to the
extent of any conflict. '30 8 The Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that it
was "unreasonable to assume the Texas Legislature retained the rights of
inspection and settlement under the DTPA, but preempted the liability
structure under the DTPA that gives rise to those rights. ' 30 9 The court of
appeals thus held that the TRCLA does not preempt the DTPA.3 10
2. Necessity of Proving Causation
Liability under the DTPA is limited to conduct that is a producing
cause of the plaintiff's damages. 311 Unlike the doctrine of proximate
cause, producing cause does not require that the injury be foreseeable. 3 12
"Producing cause" has been defined as "an efficient, exciting, or contrib-
uting cause, which in a natural sequence, produced injuries or damages
complained of."'31 3 When determining whether the actions complained of
are a producing cause of a plaintiff's damages, courts look to whether the
alleged cause is a substantial factor that brings about the plaintiff's injury,
without which the injury would not have occurred. 314
In Main Place Custom Homes, Inc. v. Honaker,315 discussed above,
homeowners successfully sued a builder in connection with a slope failure
and related soil movement on the homeowners' property, allegedly
caused by water leakage from the sprinkler system coupled with the
home having been built at the juncture of two different types of soil. On
appeal, the builder challenged causation, arguing that the evidence was
legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that
the builder and its owner were together eighty-percent responsible for
the damage and that the subcontractor who installed the sprinkler system
was twenty-percent responsible for the damage. According to the
builder, the evidence instead showed that improper installation of the
sprinkler system caused the sprinkler leak, which was the primary cause
of the slope failure and the Honakers' damages. The builder also argued
that the secondary cause of the slope failure was development of the lot
before the builder purchased it.316
306. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.002 (Vernon 2006).
307. Gentry, 188 S.W.3d at 405.
308. DTPA § 17.44(b).
309. Gentry, 188 S.W.3d at 405.
310. Id.
311. Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995).
312. See Hycel, Inc. v. Wittstruck, 690 S.W.2d 914, 922 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ
dism'd).
313. Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995).
314. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995).
315. 192 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
316. Id. at 615.
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The Fort Worth Court of Appeals disagreed.3 17 The evidence at trial
showed that an independent plumber had concluded that the leaking
sprinkler hookup had been made by the builder or its subcontractors and
that the slope had failed because it was too steep, and the land was scari-
fied or terraced inappropriately with improper fill. A geotechnical engi-
neer testified that the home was located on two different ground
formations that met in a "transition area" on the property and that, when
the builder purchased the property, it had been presented with engineer-
ing reports that would raise questions about the stability of the lot and
indicate the need for further testing. The court of appeals concluded that,
considering the entire record, the evidence showed that the damage to
the property was due to numerous causes, such as the sprinkler leak, poor
drainage in the soil around the home, the inclusion of improper fill in the
back of the property, a slope that was steeper than recommended, and a
foundation that was not properly designed for the soil upon which it was
built.318 All of these problems, however, related to the original design
and placement of the home on inherently unstable soil. The court of ap-
peals also held that the Honakers' DTPA claims were based upon a
causal connection between the builder's misrepresentations regarding the
stability of the property and their damages, and the evidence supported
the conclusion that, but for the builder's misrepresentations, the
Honakers would not have incurred damages in connection with the
property.3 19
In Hoover v. Larkin,320 a defendant was able to obtain summary judg-
ment on the plaintiff's DTPA claim because the plaintiff failed to present
evidence that the alleged DTPA violations were the producing cause of
her alleged damages. Hoover sued her former attorney for legal malprac-
tice, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the DTPA for allegedly
mishandling the settlement of a civil litigation. In short, the plaintiff com-
plained that the defendant attorney failed to advise her that a settlement
offer she accepted in the underlying dispute was a gross amount rather
than a net amount. The attorney moved for and was granted summary
judgment.321 The plaintiff appealed, and the Houston Court of Appeals
reversed the summary judgment on the DTPA claim.322 On remand, the
defendant attorney again moved for summary judgment on the DTPA
claim, arguing that the plaintiff presented no evidence of causation of her
317. Id. at 620.
318. Id. at 619.
319. Id. at 616-20. See also Reynolds v. Murphy, 188 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2006, pet. denied) (holding that an investor's DTPA claim against the author and
publisher of an investment-related newsletter failed for lack of causation because the in-
vestor did not follow the author's advice to hold the recommended stocks long term so his
losses were caused by his decision to sell, rather than any misrepresentations about the
author's abilities).
320. 196 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
321. Id. at 228-29.




On the second appeal, the court of appeals explained that the plaintiff
was required to present some evidence that, "but for" the attorney's ac-
tionable conduct, she would not have sustained injury, in this case attor-
ney's fees. Stated differently, the court of appeals explained that the
violation must be the producing cause of the injury.32 4 As this was a no-
evidence motion for summary judgment, Hoover had the burden of pro-
ducing evidence that she incurred attorney's fees because of the attor-
ney's allegedly wrongful conduct. 325 The court of appeals agreed with the
trial court that she failed to present- any such evidence.32 6 Accordingly,
the court of appeals concluded that the trial court properly granted sum-
mary judgment on the DTPA claim.327
3. Procedural Issues
A plaintiff seeking damages under the DTPA is required to give sixty-
days notice before filing suit. 328 If a plaintiff fails to comply with the
notice requirement, the court must abate the proceedings for sixty
days.32 9 If the court has not ruled within eleven days after a properly
verified motion to abate is filed and the plaintiff has not responded to the
motion, then the suit is automatically abated without court order until
sixty days after the plaintiff serves the required written notice.330 This
pre-suit demand requirement is intended to discourage litigation and en-
courage settlement. 331
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas,
Dallas Division, considered the pre-suit demand requirement in Kennard
v. Indianapolis Life Insurance Co.,332 which arose from the attempted
creation of a tax shelter. Kennard and his professional association estab-
lished a defined benefit plan to provide its employees with retirement
benefits. At the suggestion of Indianapolis Life agents, Kennard estab-
lished a defined benefit plan that was represented as being in compliance
with the Internal Revenue Code. Indianapolis Life also promised that
the plan would provide significant tax benefits. The Internal Revenue
Service subsequently determined that Kennard's plan was not in compli-
ance with the Internal Revenue Code and did not qualify for the prom-
323. Id. at 230.
324. Id. at 230.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. Ibarra v. Nat'l Constr. Rentals, Inc., 199 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2006, no pet.) also addresses the causation requirement under the DTPA. In Ibarra, the
trial court granted the DTPA defendant's no-evidence motion for summary judgment. On
appeal, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the plaintiff provided
evidence that, at best, raised a mere surmise or suspicion of causation, which is, in legal
effect, no evidence. Id. at 35-36.
328. DTPA § 17.505(a).
329. Hines v. Hash, 843 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Tex. 1992).
330. DTPA § 17.505.
331. Hines, 843 S.W.2d at 468-69.
332. 420 F. Supp. 2d 601 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
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ised tax benefits. 333
Kennard sued Indianapolis Life and its agents, alleging DTPA viola-
tions. The defendants filed a motion to abate the DTPA claim on the
ground that no pre-suit demand had been served. Kennard responded
that subsequent to filing suit he gave the required notice to the defend-
ants. The district court concluded that, since the case "was automatically
abated pursuant to the DTPA," and the sixty-day period after the notice
was served had already expired, there was no reason to abate, and the
motion would be denied. 334
In Clark v. Power Marketing Direct, Inc.,335 the Houston Court of Ap-
peals considered whether a forum-selection clause contained in a license
agreement covered pre-contractual claims, including DTPA claims.
Licensees brought an action against the licensor for fraud in the induce-
ment of the license agreement as well as for violations of the DTPA. The
license agreement contained a forum-selection clause that provided that
any suit:
arising under or as a result of this Agreement shall be filed in the
Common Pleas Court of Franklin County, Ohio, and [licensee]
hereby agrees and consents to the jurisdiction of the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas as to any dispute involving the parties' busi-
ness relationship, including personal jurisdiction over [licensee] and
subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.336
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss based on this
clause. Applying an abuse of discretion standard of review, the court of
appeals affirmed.337 In analyzing the issue, the court of appeals stated
that forum-selection clauses are prima facie valid and are to be enforced
unless a party can demonstrate that the clause is unreasonable under the
circumstances. 338 Applying this test to the facts before it, the court of
appeals affirmed the dismissal, concluding the clause was broad enough
to encompass the DTPA claim. 339
IV. CONCLUSION
This was not a good year for antitrust plaintiffs. Of the seven civil cases
selected for this Survey, the plaintiffs lost them all.340 On the DTPA side,
plaintiffs continued their unbroken string of losing more cases than they
won, although they improved on last year's dismal thirteen percent show-
333. Id. at 604-05.
334. Id. at 610.
335. 192 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
336. Id. at 797.
337. Id. at 798, 800.
338. Id. at 799-800.
339. Id. at 800.
340. An unpublished opinion not selected for the survey is PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Crea-
tive Prods., 171 F. App'x 464 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 763 (2006), which affirmed
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff on a resale price maintenance claim. The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari, and its opinion will be reported in next year's Survey.
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ing. Of the twenty-two private civil DTPA cases reviewed in this year's
Survey, the plaintiffs won seven, or thirty-two percent. Still, in no year
since the authors began writing the annual Survey have DTPA plaintiffs
managed a .500 appellate batting average.
This year's Survey continues another longstanding trend. Of the deci-
sions favoring the defendant, six of the seven antitrust cases and 12 of the
15 DTPA cases were summary judgments or other dispositions on legal
grounds. Remarkably, in two of the antitrust cases, the basis for rejecting
the plaintiff's case was raised for the first time on appeal-in one instance
by the court itself.
The Coca-Cola decision is noteworthy for several reasons. Appellate
lawyers no doubt were surprised to learn that their cases may be decided
on grounds never raised by any party in the trial court, in the court of
appeals, or before the supreme court itself. The basis for the court's re-
fusal to enforce the antitrust laws of neighboring states-that antitrust
law is so "policy laden" that no state court should presume to apply the
law of a sister state-recasts abstention as an exception to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. The boundaries of this new exception remain unclear.
As the dissent noted, if a private antitrust dispute involving soda pop in-
volves "fundamental policy choices" of greater importance than, for ex-
ample, a dispute over the custody of a child, "it is unclear ... what other
claims against Texas residents cannot be brought in Texas courts."'341 By
such a measure, it would appear that state consumer protection laws (in-
cluding the DTPA) likewise are destined for the new black hole of inter-
state abstention.
As the dissent noted, the majority's ostensible concerns regarding con-
flict of laws were illusory, as the antitrust laws of Texas' neighboring
states are-like the TFEAA itself-modeled on the federal antitrust
laws. It is unclear how this new abstention doctrine will play out in fed-
eral district courts asked to apply the antitrust laws of Texas or another
state. If a Texas state court cannot be trusted to apply a sister state's
antitrust law, it is not apparent why either a federal court or another
state's courts should presume to apply Texas' antitrust laws either. This
implicit "Don't Mess With Texas" aspect of abstention was not addressed
by either the Coca-Cola majority or the dissent, and its future application
will be legal terra incognita-provided it survives constitutional scrutiny.
Surely it is a novel brand of federalism that Balkanizes economic markets
by bisecting them across state lines, as is a policy of denying litigants a
state law remedy in state court, sending them down the street to sue "in
federal court under federal antitrust laws."'342
As interesting as these questions may be, they likely are only of aca-
demic interest to the Coca-Cola litigants. Although the majority and dis-
sent extensively debated the abstention issue, it appears unlikely that a
contrary decision on that point would have changed the result, as the ma-
341. 218 S.W.3d at 697.
342. Id. at 686-87.
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jority went on to globally reject the TFEAA claims as a matter of law
anyway.
In rejecting the TFEAA claims, the majority erred at the level of first
principles. First, the court erroneously required proof of mathematically
quantifiable marketwide effects in order to sustain a claim of unreasona-
ble restraint of trade under TFEAA subsection 15.05(a). The majority
acknowledged that Coke's seventy-five-percent market share supported
an inference of monopoly power, that the record "was replete with evi-
dence that Coke used its dominant market position to extract from retail-
ers agreements with terms it might not otherwise been able to obtain,"
that those agreements "made it more difficult for [the plaintiffs] to com-
pete," 343 and that Coca-Cola's practices raised the prices of competitive
products to consumers and, in some instances, made those products un-
available in stores subject to the restrictive agreements. Yet the majority
rejected the subsection 15.05(a) claim as a matter of law because the
plaintiffs failed to quantify a marketwide effect on price or output, or a
percentage of market foreclosure. Here the majority misapprehended
the nature of the competitive-injury inquiry.344 Interference with "con-
sumer choice by impeding the 'ordinary give and take of the market"' is a
hallmark of competitive injury.345 Impairment of consumers' ability to
make informed "apples to apples" product comparisons and raising the
information costs of customers also constitute injury to competition.346
Indeed, "the majority of producers produce much more complex amalga-
mations that consist of the product or service itself, branding, display fa-
cilities, advertising, and other forms of communication. All of these
things are parts of the business firm's output. '347 Although the Coca-
Cola majority acknowledged that the result of the defendants' exclusion-
ary practices was to deprive consumers of rivals' products at convenience
stores, the solution was not the imposition of antitrust liability but to send
consumers "down the street" to another store. 348 Evidently lost on the
majority is the fact that the raison d'etre of convenience stores is con-
sumer convenience.
343. Id. at 689.
344. "We are often unable to disentangle the effects of challenged conduct. That is the
reason we are so often forced to turn to surrogates for actual effects." VII P. AREEDA &
H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1503, at 351 (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter "ANTITRUST
LAW"]. "Because market, output reductions are difficult to measure, the antitrust tribunal
must rely on surrogates. The usual one is market power, plus inferences to be drawn from
the character of the agreement." Id. at 352.
345. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (quoting National Soc.
of Prof'l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692, (1978)); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n,
895 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1990).
346. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459, 461-62; VII ANTITRUST LAW $ 1503a, at
348-49, 351; Wilk, 895 F.2d at 360; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs.,
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 473-76 (1992) (recognizing the significance of information costs when
assessing competitive effects).
347. III ANTITRUST LAW, I 1503a.
348. 218 S.W.3d at 689..
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With respect to the monopolization claim, the majority confused the
principles applicable to restraints of trade under Sherman Act section 1
and its counterpart TFEAA provision, subsection 15.05(a), and the prin-
ciples that govern claims of unlawful monopolization under Sherman Act
section 2 and TFEAA subsection 15.05(b). Contrary to the majority's
assumption, the rule-of-reason mode of analysis applicable to the former
is neither coterminous with, nor necessarily dispositive of, the latter. In
many cases, the two will follow along similar lines of inquiry and reach
consistent results; in others, however, both the analysis and results will
differ. 34 9
The Coca-Cola majority's insistence on an economist's mathematical
demonstration of anticompetitive effects is a throwback to the pseudo-
quantitative economics of the so-called Chicago School reign of antitrust.
Although one of the justifications offered by the Coca-Cola majority for
refusing to recognize the antitrust laws of adjoining states is the fact that
"'varying times and circumstances' give antitrust law changing con-
tent,"' 350 the Coca-Cola majority seems stuck in the 1980s. The Coca-
Cola dissent supplied the majority with ample caselaw supporting affirm-
ance of the jury's verdict; 35 1 however, the majority did not address those
authorities in its opinion.
It should surprise no one that legal arguments based upon an
econometric view of antitrust rely on methods that predispose the validity
of that view, namely methods designed to identify and quantify
econometric data. Setting aside the circularity between the ontological
position taken by advocates of such a view and the methods employed to
vindicate that position, the problem with such an approach is that it re-
quires measurement of what often is unmeasurable. 352 Recognizing that
it usually is impossible to mathematically measure "but-for" economic ef-
fects, antitrust focuses on whether the defendant possesses market power
and whether the challenged conduct is efficiency-enhancing or unduly
349. Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911); United States v. Dentsply
Int'l, 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005); Le Page's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 151-52 (3d Cir.
2003); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see generally III
ANTITRUST LAW 606 (2d ed. 2002); VII ANTITRUST LAW 1512; E. Elhauge, Defining
Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN L. REV. 253 (2003).
350. 218 S.W.3d at 685 (quoting Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S.
717, 731 (1988)).
351. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (finding con-
certed refusal to provide x-rays to insurers violated rule of reason absent any finding of
marketwide effect on price or output or foreclosure); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech.
Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Conwood Co., L.P. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 789 (6th
Cir. 2002); see also supra note 371. The closest the majority came to acknowledging the
authorities cited by the dissent was a "But cf." footnote citation to Conwood, which af-
firmed liability notwithstanding proof of expanded output because the defendant's conduct
"caused higher prices and reduced consumer choice, both of which are harmful to
competition").
352. "In most cases it would be impossible for the court to measure the actual impact of
a restraint on output. Rather, the test is whether the practice would 'tend to restrict com-
petition and decrease output.'" VII ANTITRUST LAW 1503, at 351-52 (quoting Broadcast
Music v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1979)); see also supra note 344.
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exclusionary. 353
The other Survey decision to reject an antitrust claim based on an argu-
ment raised for the first time on appeal likewise compounded its error by
getting the law wrong. The basis for the Waco court's decision in Rob-
erts-that it saw no reason to differentiate antitrust standing from stand-
ing in general, which can be raised for the first time on appeal 35 4-
fundamentally misapprehends the nature of antitrust standing. Unlike
constitutional standing, which is concerned with whether there is a justici-
able case or controversy, antitrust standing is concerned with whether the
plaintiff has alleged an injury to its business or property entitling it to
relief.355 Contrary to the Waco court's assumption, antitrust standing, in-
cluding the antitrust injury requirement on which the court based its
opinion, is not jurisdictional. 356
This is not to say that the Roberts court reached the wrong result. The
antitrust claim clearly was defective but for a reason with which the court
evidently was unfamiliar. The essence of the plaintiffs' claim-that the
defendant was providing services to a competitor at a price lower than
the price that was available to the plaintiff-is not actionable under the
TFEAA. Although, in enacting the TFEAA, the legislature modeled the
statute on certain provisions of the federal Sherman and Clayton Acts, it
did not enact a state law version of the Robinson-Patman Act, which is
the federal price-discrimination law. 357 Hence the plaintiffs' claim simply
was not cognizable under the TFEAA.
As the dissent in Coca-Cola observed, not since the enactment of the
TFEAA in 1983 has the Texas Supreme Court found a violation of the
statute. Given the court's determinedly static approach toward antitrust
enforcement, perhaps consumers in adjacent states will take some com-
fort in the fact that the Texas courts are uninterested in interpreting their
antitrust laws. For Texas consumers of soft drinks, however, the major-
ity's suggestion to go "down the street" to Wal-Mart no doubt is cold
comfort, as is its suggestion that Coke's competitors go down the street to
federal court.
353. See id.
354. Roberts v. Whitfill, 191 S.W. 3d 348, 356 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, no pet.).
355. See II ANTITRUST LAW T 335a, at 286-87 (2d ed. 2000).
356. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984); In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Anti-
trust Litig., 289 F.3d 98, 107-08 (D.C. Cir. 2002); D. Berger and R. Bernstein, An Analytical
Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L. REV. 809, 813 n. 11 (1977) (cited with ap-
proval in Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 535 n. 31 (1983)); New York v. Microsoft Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139-44
(D.D.C. 2002).
357. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.05 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006); Com-
ment, The Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust-Act-Analysis and Implications, 22 Hous. L.
REV. 1181, 1196 (1985); Note, The Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983: A Step
Into the Present, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 733, 745 (1984); ABA ANTITRUST LAW SECTION,
STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND STATUES, p. 46-19 (1990) ("The Texas Free Enterprise
and Antitrust Act of 1983 has no analogue to the Robinson-Patman Act."). Even had it
done so, the Robinson-Patman Act only applies to the sale or lease of commodities. It
does not apply to services. See 15 U.S.C. § 13a; ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTI-
TRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 469 (5th ed. 2002) (citing cases).
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